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1975/02/14

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

February 14, 1975

~~SECRET~~INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR: GENERAL SCOWCROFT

FROM: W. R. SMYSER *WR for WRS*
WILLIAM L. STEARMAN *WLS*

SUBJECT: Phil Habib's Meeting on the Third Year
Assistance Proposal on Vietnam


Phil Habib chaired an interagency meeting on February 12 to discuss the President's recent proposal for a three year terminal assistance program for Vietnam. (Minutes of the meeting are at Tab A).

The key items of discussion were as follows:

-- Ambassador Martin presented the following program breakdown to be employed for initial discussion.

	<u>High Option</u>			<u>Low Option</u>		
	<u>Mil</u>	<u>Econ</u>	<u>Yearly Totals</u>	<u>Mil</u>	<u>Econ</u>	<u>Yearly Totals</u>
'76	1.7	800	2.5	1.7	800	2.5
'77	1.5	750	2.25	1.3	700	2.0
'78	<u>1.1</u>	<u>650</u>	1.75	<u>1.0</u>	<u>500</u>	1.5
	4.3	<u>2.2</u>		4.0	<u>2.0</u>	
Totals for 3 years	\$6.5 billion			\$6.0 billion		

Martin suggested that the above options, including the \$6-\$6.5 billion range, would generally mesh with Secretary Kissinger's July 22 letter to Chairman Fulbright setting forth a proposed five year assistance program to Vietnam.

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-- Mr. Habib stated that it would be important to build a fence around the three year proposal and adhere to the position that aid will not be necessary in subsequent years if our three year request is appropriated.

-- Habib stated there will be a real need to prove to the Congress that the GVN will have the wherewithal to survive upon the conclusion of this program.

-- Mr. Goldberg said the program is the only chance we have with the Congress to obtain reasonable levels of aid.

-- [REDACTED] (CIA) suggested that if the program is to work we have to assume some very optimistic developments regarding security in South Vietnam. Ambassador Martin expressed a conviction that the South Vietnamese will hold their present positions successfully if they are assured of high levels of support over the next three years.

-- CIA is preparing an estimate of the probable North Vietnamese reaction to the adoption of such a three year program.

-- The EA Bureau in State is putting together a basic outline developing this proposal and an overview of all the elements which should be included

-- Both of us pointed out that the President's proposal was a concept which could be worked out with Congress but that no final decision on our program had been made. We also cautioned against forming a special group to work on a three year aid program.

